Spurs turn ambitious with Villas-Boas

New project: Villas-Boas. Photo: Michel Di Feliciantonio

The appointment of André Villas-Boas is a risky step by Daniel Levy, but one than can ultimately turn Tottenham into champions

The hiring of Harry Redknapp was always at odds with Daniel Levy’s nature. After Juande Ramos’s disastrous era, the Tottenham chairman needed safety and stability; someone to steady the ship and steer it towards the top. But as he must have suspected, Redknapp never had the competence to go further. Now, finally, Tottenham have someone who does.

The exciting thing about Villas-Boas’s projects is their potential. The level of the 34-year-old Portuguese’s ambition is, like Levy’s, ludicrously high, and his philosophy matches it. High pressing, intense tempo and possession focus is a style designed for long-term domestic domination. More so, Villas-Boas can pull it off. Succeed, and his side can win 27 and draw three out of 30 league matches, like the Porto side of 2010/2011. Fail, and the project can crash completely, like at Chelsea.

This is the risky leap Levy has taken, and which is necessary to reach the top. Redknapp’s dismissal was not a matter of? competence but rather about limitations. While his side was capable of offering sparkling football, his principles were never advanced enough to turn Tottenham into title challengers. It required newer thinking and a more sophisticated set-up to bring long-term success and continuity. That is why Ramos came in 2007. With Villas-Boas, Levy is having another go.

Traps

Can the project work? The biggest concern for any club Villas-Boas manages is the gap between player quality and suitability, and the nature of the playing system. At Chelsea, the Portuguese seemed to impose a style similar to Porto’s, but with players seemingly incapable of adapting. While his ideas were bright, the changes were too many and came too quickly.

Daniel Levy. Photo: Vinod Divakaran/Doha Stadium Plus

Part of that problem was that Chelsea’s strategies still resembled the concepts laid down by José Mourinho. It may be speculative to wonder to what extend Mourinho’s beliefs are still influencing Chelsea – though their Champions League victory reminded more of Inter’s European triumph in 2010/2011 than anything Roberto Di Matteo has stood for – but either way, the set-up has remained relatively unaltered since the Special One left Stamford Bridge. Breaking it up was part of Villas-Boas’s assignment, though when he tried, rifts occurred.

At Tottenham players should be more receptive to new ideas, but beware of another rushed revolution. Villas-Boas says he plans to retire early due to the strain of coaching and, combined with his ambitious nature, impatience is perhaps inevitable. Yet that hastiness may also be linked with his time under Mourinho, during which immediate success became the norm. Having developed his talent in that culture, Villas-Boas is not going to change.

Two-month project?

The potential problem with that mentality is the sometimes naive relationship between Villas-Boas’s attacking mantra and the time available. Mourinho’s success was based on defensive assuredness; effective positional practice, intensively drilled during pre-season to shut the opposition out. Rafa Benítez and Roberto Mancini’s projects at Liverpool and Manchester City were also built on reliable defending, while flair was added in later years.

Conversely, Villas-Boas’s bases his play on attack, an area of higher complexity that requires more time, practice and fine-tuning before it can be relied upon to win matches. This rings true for anyone but Barcelona, where a philosophy has been shared over several years. Villas-Boas must build this from scratch and, last year, he appeared to assume this would happen quicker than it did. At Tottenham he must adopt a more cautious approach or find more effective ways to make his principle stick.

Dynamism

More positively, the Tottenham squad is well suited to Villas-Boas’s system. His formation remains unknown, though another crack at the 4-3-3 appears likely, particularly with Scott Parker available as a holding midfielder and wingers like Aaron Lennon and Gareth Bale. Emanuel Adebayor also makes a suitable lone forward, should he sign permanently from Manchester City, while new signing Jan Vertonghen is mobile enough to set a high defensive line.

Yet the overriding advantage is that of dynamism. Villas-Boas had at Chelsea too many players without either work rate or defensive awareness. Daniel Sturridge and Florent Malouda were never entirely committed to defensive tasks, while John-Obi Mikel was largely static in his holding role. Bale and Lennon possess a different tempo and are accustomed to intensity and pressing from Redknapp’s reign. Centrally, Villas-Boas can call on Scott Parker and Sandro – and almost certainly either Luka Modri? or Jo?o Moutinho – players with boundless energy capable of covering ground.

This sets the tone for a squad capable of gliding into his specific system much quicker than that at Chelsea. The extent to which they do will rest on Villas-Boas’s training methods and his ability to get players to buy into his ideas – an area where failed miserably at Chelsea. That said, man management was rarely an issue at Porto, and if the Portuguese’s beliefs can be instilled through a good start, the project may well snowball into the title challenge Levy is hoping for it to be.

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Pictures

André Villas-Boas: Michel Di Feliciantonio

Daniel Levy: Vinod Divakaran/Doha Stadium Plus

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Watford 0-1 Tottenham: Villas-Boas’s 4-2-3-1

Friendly game: Watford-Tottenham at Vicarage Road

The characteristics of André Villas-Boas’s 4-2-3-1 are similar to his 4-3-3 system at Chelsea, but much work remains to make it equally functional.?

Friendly matches may rarely indicate true form, but this bleak and lacklustre display will reassure no one over the Villas-Boas project, particularly with Thursday’s game away to Valencia the only remaining fixture before the Premiership kicks off.

Here, albeit with a reduced squad, Tottenham were slow and uninspiring. There were indications of certain tactical patterns but little action to examine their efficiency. The passing tempo was slow, the concentration poor and few attacking scenarios were constructed. Still, there were some hints of what to expect from Villas-Boas’s side this season.

Build-up play

The ambitiousness of Villas-Boas’s favoured system appears unchanged. The wide players stretch the pitch as much as possible while the full-backs push extremely high up the pitch. In possession, the slow tempo remains, indicating a trust in individual creativity that borders to that of Barcelona. That didn’t work here, with Jermaine Jenas and Jake Livermore unable to play the attackers into good positions, causing a staleness to the build-up play. Attacking midfielder Tom Carroll, a youth academy product, was also easily snuffed out centrally, meaning the few half-decent moves came through Gareth Bale and Aaron Lennon out wide.

The first half: Tottenham's movement in possession

While most passes were short and simple, there would occasionally be long passes lofted forward, particularly towards the flanks. This looked very simplistic – Lennon or Bale would simply start a run in behind Watford’s defence and a centre-back would play it long – as opposed to a more sophisticated movement involving several players. This may have been an option reluctantly resorted to since the central midfield wasn’t good enough to outpass or outwit Watford.

A notable if unsurprising feat was the fluidity of Tottenham’s midfield. When the centre-backs were in possession, the midfield triangle constantly moved and shifted its shape to provide options (though few were taken). Livermore and Jenas could suddenly move high up towards Defoe while Carroll dropped down towards the centre-backs, making it a 4-3-3.

The same occurred in the second half with the introduction of Gylfi Siguresson, albeit less so as Villas-Boas wanted the Iceland international closer to goal. Still, in terms of how Villas-Boas structures his side, the switch from 4-3-3 (as used at Porto and Chelsea) to 4-2-3-1 indicates a minimal change.

Defending

While Tottenham did little with the ball, they pressed relentlessly and aggressively when they lost it – another common Villas-Boas feat. The full-backs could close down deep into Watford’s half, while both holding midfielders occasionally pushed forward to pressure Watford’s central midfielders when they dropped deep to receive the ball. The much-criticised defensive line remained high, although with few problems here due to the superior athleticism of Younès Kaboul and William Gallas.

Bale and the Hulk role

Since Tottenham’s central line was largely a makeshift one, the game’s most interesting part centred on Bale and Lennon’s movement. Both stayed wide early on, leaving Carroll and Defoe too isolated centrally, though this changed when the two wingers swapped positions. While Lennon remained wide out left, Bale would drift in centrally according to the space behind Watford’s defensive line. If Watford pushed up, Bale would stay close to Defoe, looking to break in behind the centre-back. When Tottenham were in the final third he would stay wide, looking for a pass into feet to take on the left-back. There was also a mixture of the two movements where, instead of breaking in behind the defence, Bale would pick up the ball deep and relatively wide before running at Watford’s central defence – as he did successfully on occasions last year. The hosts were too organised here however, and Bale was missing an attacking midfielder to drag players out wide to get sufficient space – à la what Mesut ?zil does so well at Real Madrid.

Bale: 1) Stays wide to take on the full-back 2) Drifts centrally to fool the offside trap 3) Wanders inside to run at the centre-backs (click for larger image)

Overall though, Bale’s position on the right was Tottenham’s most unpredictable element. Interestingly, this position has been a key feature at Villas-Boas’s previous clubs, often combined with an attacking right-back and a central midfielder making constant runs. Players thrive in it too – Hulk at Porto and Daniel Sturridge at Chelsea – and both are left-footed attackers with an eye for goal. Bale has over the last years developed into that kind of player, and it will be interesting to see on what side Villas-Boas plays him. Outside wingers is uncommon of the Portuguese, and would make even less sense if Tottenham failed to sign Emmanuel Adebayor or an alternative aerial threat.

Second half

Tottenham upped the tempo after the break and improved immediately. The passing was quicker, enabling the defenders to find midfielders between the lines before Watford had time to condense space. Siguresson came on but did little, though it was notable that he rarely ventured into the box for crosses, instead lurking outside it to pick up loose balls for long shots and finishes. His appearance also meant Bale and Lennon switched back to their original positions, a wise move considering Siguresson’s tendency to stay centrally as opposed to drifting wide. The goal came from a Defoe header on 55 minutes from Kyle Walker’s cross, the right-back having replaced Kyle Naughton at half-time.

Still naive?

In short, this match confirmed that Villas-Boas is sticking to his original system despite the slight change in formation – a switch made simply to accommodate the players inherited. The attacking variations were few and disappointing, though this may be linked with the absence of first-team players. Most of Tottenham’s players played poorly – Kaboul and Bale in particular, with Bale creating virtually nothing despite a series of attempts – and looked some distance away from being ready for Premiership action.

The real question is whether Villas-Boas will persist with this ambitious system against stronger teams – particularly away from home – as he did, somewhat naively, at Chelsea. Tottenham’s pre-season fixtures have so far been too easy to give us an answer, though perhaps more clues will be offered away to Valencia on Thursday.

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Tactics: The reintroduction of Villas-Boas’s 4-3-3

Strong values: Villas-Boas. Photo: www.thesportreview.com

The Portuguese’s redeployment of Porto’s 4-3-3 formation at Chelsea only scratches the surface of what is a replica of deeper tactical concepts.?

André Villas-Boas’s methods are still being questioned. Last weekend he had to defend his adventurous football philosophy – like all managers are when losing – after conceding five goals to Arsenal at Stamford Bridge.

Interestingly though, reporters quizzed him in context of José Mourinho, a tactical chameleon whose success is centred on pragmatism.

“I won’t change my philosophy,” the Chelsea manager responded. “It’s a personal and club value and we will not sell it cheaply. It makes us proud with the way we are playing. We just have to correct things.”

His answer emphasised two differences to the Special One: Villas-Boas is more attacking – and less flexible. Within months at Stamford Bridge, Mourinho dropped his narrow 4-4-2 diamond in favour of 4-3-3 to accommodate Arjen Robben, Joe Cole and Damien Duff. With Villas-Boas, the system is pre-determined, and players adapt to the formation. In fact so much so that? several Chelsea players perform near-identical roles to those of last year’s all-conquering Porto side.

Attack: Chelsea’s fluent set-up under Villas-Boas

Chelsea v Porto

A closer comparison of Chelsea 2011/2012 and Porto 2010/2011?reveals these similarities; collectively and individually. Both are certainly athletic, dynamic and versatile, suiting Villas-Boas’s notion of high pressure and attacking fluency.

But Chelsea were also accustomed to the 4-3-3; a default formation since Mourinho departed. Key positions such as wingers and defensive midfielders were all in place. This might have been a factor for Villas-Boas’s summer move – he saw a team capable of gliding into his tried-and-tested system with relative ease.

Inheriting a new squad, the Portuguese has fitted players into a carbon-copy of Porto’s 4-3-3 tactic, with roles, runs and movements reinstalled. Below follows an analysis of the system and the similarities between those who have occupied the specific roles at Porto 2010/2011 and Chelsea 2011/2012.

?ech v Helton

The goalkeeper may not be the best place to start tactically; it is always slightly isolated from a collective tactic. However, notably, ?ech now retains possession instead of lumping balls upwards. While this doesn’t suit the lanky Czech, it does suit Villas-Boas’s tactic and its focus on ball circulation, and the ‘keeper has had to conform.

Terry and Luiz v Rolando and Otamendi

While Villas-Boas possessed decent pace and distribution in Rolando and Nicolás Otamendi at Porto, those qualities are not always present at Chelsea. The agile David Luiz certainly fits the template, but an injury coupled with inconsistency has prevented a longer stay in the team. Yet despite having slow defenders, Villas-Boas has refused to adapt, instead keeping a high defensive line while playing Terry and the static Branislav Ivanovi?. The result has been a void between a tactical ideal and player material, which some, notably Arsenal, have exploited.

Bosingwa and Cole v Sapunaru and Pereira

Attacking full-backs remain a cornerstone to the system. Porto’s pairing, Christian Sapunaru and álvaro Peirera, the Uruguayan who nearly followed Villas-Boas to Stamford Bridge, always looked to push forward, often advancing further than the midfield trio to maintain width and support when wingers drifted inwards.

In this sense, José Bosingwa would always be preferred to Ivanovic at Chelsea and he shares four assists with Ashley Cole so far. They are a perfect match; dynamic, hard working and capable of dribbling in one v one situations. When Chelsea control the tempo, two thirds of their game effectively consists of wing-play, often involving runs directly behind the defence (see Cole against Arsenal).

Invincible: Porto 2010/2011 (apologies for visual quality)

Mikel v Fernando

The anchor role is hardly revolutionary, yet Villas-Boas plays it deeper than most. John Obi Mikel and Fernando, the Brazilian, sit closer to defence than midfield, distributing,? breaking up attacks and covering? the full-backs.

A common move is for the centre-halves to split and support the full-backs in wide positions, while the anchor man drops down, forming a three-man defence to maintain defensive balance. Sitting so deep, the passes are always short and simple, with through balls rarely risked.

Lampard v Moutinho

This positions belongs to an industrious central midfielder. Jo?o Moutinho, the former Sporting captain, was a perfect fit at Porto,? combining tactical awareness with a good distance shot and a neat passing game. The Portugal international mainly worked from box to box, sharing duties equally between attack and defence.

Lampard is more offensive by comparison. This destabilises the team, with only three defensive players left to cover, and Villas-Boas knows allowing his natural game to flourish is a tactical compromise.

In fact, Lampard nearly lost his place earlier this season, only to hit back with sensational form. To emulate Porto, Raul Meireles makes an excellent option for the role but, seemingly, Lampard’s goals have convinced Villas-Boas that defensive stability is worth risking.

Ramires v Belluschi

The most attacking midfield role, located on the right side, is also the most interesting. It was handed to Fernando Belluschi at Porto; a small, quick and technical Argentine originally equipped for a wide or attacking midfield role. However, Villas-Boas played him as a central midfielder, telling him to break forward according to the movement of Hulk.

This made Porto extremely dangerous down the right. When Hulk received the ball wide, Belluschi would bomb in behind the left back, a movement pacy strikers often make when drifting wide. Conversely, when Hulk drifted inside to drag the full-back with him, Belluschi would overlap to overload the zone, supported by the attacking Sapunaru.

With Falcao staying centrally, at least one centre-back remained occupied. This mean that, to stop Belluschi, the other had to shuffle wide, dragging the entire defence towards the left. Alternatively a midfielder could track him, but the Argentine was speedy and usually gained enough space to create trouble. The left midfielder could also follow him, but that left right-back Sapunaru free.

Chelsea have re-created this move and its occupant, Ramires has scored four goals in eight matches – compensating technical trickery with stamina and tirelessness. At Porto the more defensive Fredy Guarín, who also played the role on occasions, netted five times from 22 appearances.

Sturridge v Hulk

These midfielders’ movement works in tandem with a left-footed right winger. Hulk played this role to perfection at Porto, running directly at defenders and powering shots home from distance.? To keep the same fluency at Chelsea, Villas-Boas opted for Daniel Sturridge; originally a striker like Hulk was. That selection reflects how highly the Portuguese prizes this move, with Nicolas Anelka, Florent Malouda and Didier Drogba all capable in other roles, yet benched.

Collective movement: The two varieties where Porto overloaded the right wing. Chalkboard courtesy of This11.com (with modifications).

Mata v Varela

Unlike the right side, the left wing is fairly independent of collective movement. At Porto, Silvestre Varela hugged the touchline before cutting inside, yet was left relatively on his own. Copying the Porto blueprint, Villas-Boas has allowed himself to tinker with Juan Mata’s role, letting him roam freely to take up a playmaker role between the lines. The Spaniard can also play Sturridge/Hulk’s role.

Torres v Falcao

The striker exists purely to score goals, and who better than Falcao and Torres. They mainly stay centrally, inviting to one-twos, testing the offside trap or taking up positions to convert crosses.

Goals under Villas-Boas are often scored from a sudden killer pass or quick attacks orchestrated in two or three touches. This makes sharpness, movement and acceleration important; classic ‘poacher’ qualities, which both possess. Notably, the increasingly-static Didier Drogba fits equally badly into that description, and the Ivorian stands with one goal in seven games this season despite Chelsea’s being relatively free-scoring.

Summary

Villas-Boas had many options when he arrived at Chelsea. He could have played Torres and Drogba together, formed a 4-4-2 diamond or a 4-2-3-1 with Mata as trequartista. Yet he kept his formation, his philosophies and his values from Porto, asserting them over a different squad with varying success to date. The defensive line remains a concern but, the way his system is inscribed in stone, changing one area will only affect the rest.

Such inflexibility remains a weakness but Chelsea will take some stopping once their sophisticated 4-3-3 system finds its tune. Until then, fueled by the 5-3 defeat to Arsenal, questions will continue over Villas-Boas’s commitment to attacking football. However, as the Portuguese will know, defending football’s noble beliefs is nothing new for outstanding managers. Just ask Arsène Wenger.

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Note: Villas-Boas picture credit to www.thesportreview.com

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Swansea’s success down to Martinez’s Catalan legacy

Martinez: Left his project half-finished. Photo: Dan Farrimond

Brendan Rodgers may have taken most of the plaudits after guiding Swansea to the Premier League, but it is Roberto Martinez who deserves the main credit for the Jacks’ historic achievement.

It was the spring of 2007 when Swansea’s road to the Premiership really started. The club had been drifting outside the League One play-offs for years, and clouds of confusion and nostalgia were hanging over a fanbase still licking their wounds after the heartbreaking departure of Lee Trundle.

Six months earlier, current Millwall manager Kenny Jacket had departed to pave way for the reincarnation of Roberto Martinez? – the Catalan getting his first managerial job at the club he had enjoyed a three-year spell with as a midfield general and skipper only a season earlier.

The summer had given him time to prepare, and a host of players from the Spanish lower leagues were added alongside a couple of free-transfer signings from Scotland. I had just started my studies in Swansea at the time, and was privileged enough to witness a transformation that was to break with the conventional values of lower league football.

Fundamental changes

For Swansea, the appointment of Martinez signaled a shift in philosophy which was as brave as it was radical. Indeed, the nature of the team he was about to built has arguably been unique to the lower leagues of English football in modern times.

Whereas Swansea had been like any other club up until then – favouring the standardised English template of 4-4-2 and a high-tempo playing style – Martinez created a possession-based 4-5-1 system suited to a slow and patient tempo.

Success did not come easy. Martinez was initially undecided between a 4-4-2 and a 4-5-1 formation, and many games at the Liberty saw Swansea keep the ball for long spells inside their own half trying to outpass the opposition – to no effect. The movement was slow, there was no initiative and players were clearly uncomfortable with the system.

Indeed, several games ended goalless despite Swansea holding the majority of possession, prompting criticism that the club had failed to replace Lee Trundle who was so famous for his individual brilliance and match-winning moments.

This struggle provoked a fascinating contrast of cultures. While players would try to pass themselves out of trouble, the fans would scream from the stands telling them to “get rid” or “hit it forward”. Yet they were to be won over by a style of play that previously seemed to have been placed beyond their imaginations.

The philosophy settles

Martinez stayed true to his values and eventually settled on a 4-5-1 formation. With it came stability and a team of several new players who did not only start to know each other, but also the framework and ideas within which they operated.

Tactics: The system that won Swansea the league in 2007/2008

Key players in this side, which eventually won League One by a 10-point margin, featured many new faces. Two players had been brought in from ADO den Haag – Swansea’s collaborative club in Holland – in the likes of goalkeeper Dorus de Vries and midfield playmaker Ferrie Bodde.

Spanish midfielder Andrea Orlandi was also brought in from the Barcelona B team, alongside lightening winger Paul Anderson on loan from Liverpool. Strikers Darryl Duffy and Jason Scotland came from Hull City and St Johnstone respectively, with the latter eventually winning the fight for the position as sole striker.

Additionally, another Spaniard, Angel Rangel, was brought in at right back from Terrassa, a club outside Barcelona who once produced a certain fellow Spaniard – Xavi Hernandez.

Team structure

The midfield of Swansea in 2007/2008 had the same functions as it has today. Centrally, Ferrie Bodde was deployed as a Xabi Alonso-esque distributor with the dynamic duo of Darren Pratley and Leon Britton on either side.

The only reason Leon Britton was playing centrally was because of the excellent Paul Anderson, whose pace down the right-hand side was a constant menace for slow League One full-backs.

Britton, who was voted player of the years as a right winger the previous season, was re-invented as a possession-keeping central midfielder, a role he still masters to perfection. Vastly underrated, he was arguably Swansea’s best player under Martinez.

On the left wing, Andy Robinson tended to cut in inside to test keepers with curly long shots, while Jason Scotland – albeit lazily – held the ball up well. The Trinidad and Tobagio striker was almost unplayable at his best, and produced some moments of brilliance which decided several games.

Together, they made up a team who broke down the conventional rules of Championship strategy. They rarely crossed the ball but instead relied on cut-backs and long-range shots. They took short set pieces instead of pushing centre backs forward. And they were able, in a manner alien to other teams, to control a game through their brilliance in possession.

Below is a selection of highlights from their title-winning 2007/2008 season, as put together by SwanseaJack3:

The Championship

The solid work of Martinez had laid down a basis which made them well equipped for Championship football. Unlike fellow rivals based on guile and guts, Swansea were there because of talent implemented within a system which was repeatable and sustainable over the long-term of a season.

Their year ended with a respectable eight-place finish, and the national media started to recognise Swansea’s style of play. Perhaps the most impressive display came at home in an FA Cup quarter-final against Fulham, where the visitors were played off the park only to sneak a 1-1 draw through an own goal.

One among many to offer praise after the show, the Telegraph wrote: “Such was Swansea’s style against Fulham on Saturday that they drew more lascivious looks than was decent on Valentine’s Day.

“At 35, Martinez is “as smooth as a cashmere codpiece,” according to Ian Holloway. You never know, the Spaniard might well have a penchant for Prada pants, but it is his eye for turning bargain basement players into proponents of such easy-on-the-eye football that is causing a stir.”

As the Telegraph rightly mentioned, Martinez had vast success in the transfer market. Excellent players such as Jordi Gomez, Nathan Dyer and Ashley Williams were acquired on a shoestring budget, while the remaining players continued to develop their technical ability.

Yet for his fantastic project blossoming in front of the whole nation, Martinez accepted an offer from Wigan after the season – his first club abroad from Spain as a player – after the departure of Steve Bruce. With him came Jason Scotland, and Swansea were forced to find another manager to resume his legacy.

Below is Scotland’s trademark goal against Fulham in that FA Cup tie, signalling a lot of what Swansea would miss under their new manager the next season (video created by SwanseaCityNo12).

Paolo Sousa

The Swansea board had seen how successful Martinez had been and were keen to continue their continental style of football. In came Paolo Sousa, who had certainly had a continental playing career, and he guided Swansea to seventh, missing out on the play-offs on the last day of the season.

But while Sousa continued the possession-based style of Martinez, he made Swansea a lot more defensive. Hardly any midfielders ventured forward and the players took few risks with the ball. Conversely, the defence was rock solid, and the Swans were masters at squeezing the space between defence and midfield – in a similar manner to the side of the concept’s inventor; Arrigo Sacchi and his AC Milan.

The result was a team that conceded only 37 goals in 46 games, but which also scored only 40 goals – the least in the league, 22 less than relegated Scunthorpe; 50 less than league winners Newcastle. Central to this was also Sousa’s poor dealings in the transfer market, with Shefki Kuqi and Craig Beattie offering little but muscle and grit in front of an otherwise silky side.

At the end of the season, Sousa accepted an offer from Leicester City, and Swansea appointed Brendan Rodgers. It is difficult to say if Sousa ever improved the Swans. His signings were woeful and his style highly conservative, but he did bring a sense of much-needed cynicism and defensive positioning to the side.

Brendan Rodgers

The campaign of Brendan Rodgers is probably more documented than either Sousa’s or Martinez’s. His signings have been outstanding, especially the capture of Scott Sinclair and Fabio Borini. But just as important have been the revitalisation of Stephen Dobbie and Leon Britton, the former loaned away by Sousa, the latter returning after jumping off the sinking ship that was Sheffield United.

Flying: A Swans flag is waved at the Wembley play-off final

In summary it is fair to say that Rodgers’ team resembles a mix of Martinez’s fluency and possession-based approach, and Sousa’s organisation abilities and defensive rigidity. Yet the influence of Sousa was only a layer on a work started from scratch by the current Wigan boss.

Indeed, Rodgers’ have simply been a continuation of the Spaniard’s work, albeit a very good one. The formation has changed slightly, with the triangle in midfield now turned on its head, but essentially the style is the same.

And so are the players. Out of the starting line-up against Reading in the play-off final, Scott Sinclair and Fabio Borini were the only ones that were not in Swansea under Martinez’s tenure, or brought in by him.

Conclusion

But make no mistake; Rodgers deserves immense credit for his work at Swansea City and his professional attitude as well as gratitude in defeat. Chairman Huw Jenkins clearly has an eye for managers, and has only appointed men who are dedicated to carry the project on with the same ideals as Martinez.

Yet, as previously stated, it was the Spaniard who made the radical transformation from just another Championship team to a club which now plays a sustainable brand of football that can compete with the rest of the Premiership teams. Similarly to the legends of Liverpool, it is not only down to charisma that Bill Shankly is held in higher estimation than the more merited Bob Paisley.

It tells about an unprecedented change when a Championship outfit is dubbed the league’s own Barcelona. It is only fitting that it took a Catalan to build it.

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Villas-Boas: The alien nature of a true ‘Football Manager’

Second home: Villas-Boas is no stranger to Stamford Bridge

The arrival of Andre Villas-Boas has sparked a fascination not seen since the days of Jose Mourinho but, despite symmetric career paths, their gravity pull have different origins indeed.

Media behaviour at Stamford Bridge has been amusing in recent weeks. The arrival of the misleadingly dubbed “Mini-Mourinho” has provoked the treatment you’d give an alien on earth; careful questioning, intense listening and an analytical approach designed gain understanding of something you’ve not quite seen before.

Not that a stone remains unturned. The career of Villas-Boas has been narrated, analysed and examined; his leaked scout report dissected more than once. Yet nobody knows what we all crave to know; the mystery of his methods, his motives and how he managed to claim that blue chair at 33.

You’d be forgiven for treating Villas-Boas as a space-like creature, for his story is truly alien to what modern football has seen. Amateur footballers have aspired to great achievements as coaches – Rafa Benitez and Jose Mourinho of late – but never at such an age. It is only natural, when confronted with an unparalleled achievement, we wonder how it was done.

Mourinho’s two faces

This is where the fascination of Villas-Boas differs to that of Jose Mourinho. Of course, the disclosure of Mourinho’s training methods would have brought interest, but many have already come to light (such as “guided discovery”, short, intense sessions and focus on training with ball). It is Mourinho the character that really grips us.

Patrick Barclay of the Times spent a book trying to unpick Mourinho’s personality, analysing his attitudes to family, religion and, of course, football. It is a compelling character that unfolds under the microscope, particularly given it has two vastly different faces; one designed to win trophies, one for his private life.

With the danger of going off topic, it is worth exploring this briefly. Through Mourinho’s professional mask, every word spoken, every action taken is aimed at winning trophies. His presence turn press conferencess into theathres, his interviews are aimed not at the TV audience, but the players. Every fight picked, every complaint made; it all serves a unified purpose.

The converse personality is, fittingly, incomparable to such behaviour. Barclay explores this; how the otherwise grumpy Mourinho can suddenly be seen chatting with the cantina staff at training grounds, or catching up with an old friend from school. During a chat with Henry Winter of the Daily Telegraph, I was told the same. He’d hardly met a more charming manager in his career.

Mourinho reveals these faces too when he asked his opinion on mounting criticism against him. “True,” he answers, “but how many of these people truly know me?”

Comparisons

A book like that of Patrick Barclay will not be written about Villas-Boas. His uniqueness lies not in charisma, opinion and self-obsession – that which Mourinho demonstrated as he burst into the Stamford Bridge saloon, but in quiet genius of unparalleled nature.

This makes comparisons between the two misleading. While their training methods are similar – an inevitability given their learning environments and close relationship – their characters are incomparable. Even their names reflects this; Mourinho adopting a catchy single-worded synonymous, Villas-Boas preferring his modest, nearly awkward-sounding surname.

Perhaps the biggest difference is how Mourinho uses his own personality as a weapon, a feat of unknown territory to Villas-Boas. He is, for the sake of comparison, more similar to Rafael Benitez; an obsessive analyst who prefers to work. Attempts have been made to compare his media handling at Porto with that of Mourinho, but without much conviction.

Messi: Players like him do not come often. Photo: Adidas Italy

This difference is only natural given their experience. Mourinho has studied sports science and psychology comprehensively, equipping him with an all-round approach.Villas-Boas is a purist, his past as chief scout giving him tactical understanding such detail he has not needed to get under people’s skin.

Tactically they both share the notion of preparation and organisation. They prefer physical teams – Villas-Boas’ Porto was above all extremely powerful and dynamic, similarly to Chelsea and Inter under Mourinho. They also share smaller preferences such as inverted wingers, defensive midfielders and, notably, a corner tactic where the ball whipped towards the near post for a flick-on (at one point, Porto scored at least three goals in three games from this under Villas-Boas).

But where Villas-Boas comes short in mind games and psychology, he compensates with the understanding of attacking movements seemingly alien to Mourinho. His Porto side netted over a hundred goals last year, often through offensive full-backs and highly intelligent midfield runs. Free-flowing, yet always balanced and measured.

Indeed, when facing questions over defensive play, Mourinho often passes his style off as “balanced”, despite actually playing counter-attacking football. Porto under Villas-Boas seemed to define balance as well as anybody.

Comparisons with Messi

Given that Villas-Boas is significantly younger than Mourinho was at Chelsea, it is tempting to suggest Villas-Boas as a technically superior coach. This is dangerous of course; he will do emulate the work Mourinho did in England and Italy, but for what has happened so far, Villas-Boas has exceeded his perceived mentor.

To recap his past, his league record at Porto (24-2-0) resembles a raw talent of near inhuman measure. Not dissimilar to a certain Lionel Messi. It is problematic comparisons in many ways, but the sheer scale of their talent, and at the age it is demonstrated, they have a lot in common.

Both came through the ranks in unusual circumstances (Messi through a growth hormone and a Barca president who gave him a chance, Villas-Boas living in the hallways of Bobby Robson, who took him under his wing), and both are extraordinarily gifted. They are not outspoken, not controversial, but humble and diplomatic. Seemingly, their whole existence revolves around what happens on the pitch.

The first ‘Football Manager’

Another level of fascination comes from the fact that Villas-Boas was, originally, a football fan – a regular guy with an obsession about football surpassing the average armchair follower. Granted, he is unusually clever and hard-working but, while he may be unique to some extent, it would have been nothing without opportunity.

Indeed, just as characters such as Bobby Robson are rare to football, so are coaches such as Villas-Boas. You may say, it took a special manager to create another. Only access to professional football could have provided a regular fan with the learning environment required to become a top coach. Forget coaching courses; we are talking about hands-on experience at the highest level.

More to follow?

Many will say the rise of Villas-Boas will give belief to the uncountable number of aspiring sofa managers (just ask SI Games, developers of the Football Manager series), but that would undermine the luck Villas-Boas had. Yet of course, if you do happen to live in the hallway of an experienced world-class manager willing to give you a shot, then the best of luck to you.

A more likely conclusion is to pass Villas-Boas off as a one-of-a-kind talent, produced through series of lucky breaks explored to the fullest, through cheek, bravery and talent. Like Messi, people like Villas-Boas?come around extremely rarely. It is just how special he is that is so exciting to find out.

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United’s illogical success owes much to mental aspect

Driven: Ferguson is still going. Photo: Andrea Sartorati

After another Manchester United masterclass against wealthy rivals, most agree they have something money cannot buy. But few have debated what this actually is.

No doubt, however, that it was evident against Manchester City. Complete domination over two halves, control of possession, chances, a beautiful goal, and a thrilling finish that, strictly speaking, should not have been necessary.

Then again, as often with Manchester United, the script was already written. Not only the late goal, but the manner they always outplay seemingly stronger opponents – certainly physically. Player for player, it is hard to argue for their superiority against a side like Manchester City.

This wasn’t the first time. Repeated wins against Chelsea last year included Michael Carrick and Ryan Giggs in central midfield, faced with a trio including Michael Essien and Ramires. Predicted to be overpowered, overplayed, overrun,? United ghosted past such issues in a near illogical manner.

Observing this in an age where analysis and tactics have captured the agenda, it is easy to overemphasise science in football. Indeed, for all qualities Sir Alex Ferguson possesses, his ability to raise the collective higher than the sum of its parts remains the most unique, and perhaps the most undermined. There are other great motivators too, but only Ferguson can field seven defenders against Arsenal – and still win.

Collective values

There are many factors to this. A strong theoretical framework, a shared ideology and time on the pitch together are all boxes that are ticked at Old Trafford, a notion made even more visible amid the triumph over an anarchic Manchester City. But solely crediting this would be a simplification.

Chelsea too tick these boxes, so do Arsenal and Tottenham. They are values all coaches recognise and try to implement, and while Ferguson may be successful at doing so, it is not unique. In fact, neither is Ferguson a revolutionary tactician or a faultless transfer dealer. For all his capabilities, they cannot be said to be held explanatory for the unimaginable success he has enjoyed.

Mentality

This leads us to factors that transcend tactics, fitness and man management: the mentality of the manager. As unique as Sir Alex Ferguson the character is, so are the teams he crafts. Indeed, there is a saying that teams are reflections of their manager’s personality. No one exemplifies this as Ferguson.

Wenger: Continued motivation. Photo: Ronnie Macdonald

Unpicking his character, the Scot possesses more than just work rate and talent. There is a hunger, drive and indescribable determination, a continued will to be successful which is close to unprecedented. The importance of this quality was incidentally underlined by Arsene Wenger, when he spoke before Malaysian business men during Arsenal’s pre-season tour in Asia:

“For me, there is a very underrated quality necessary to be a success in life, and that is stamina of motivation. When you get up in the morning, you want to be successful. On Monday? Yes. On Tuesday? Maybe a bit less, and on Wednesday, maybe a bit less.

“But those who are successful are people who are capable of saying, ‘every day I want it, and I’m ready to go for it’. When we get up in the morning, we do not really want to suffer, we would like an easy day. It’s not normal for a human being to suffer. But, if you want to be successful, you have to push yourself. That’s where careers are made.”

Ferguson, 69, with constant success for 25 years, certainly has this, and it serves as a direct source to how his players treat a game. He never gives up, they never give up. His standards become their standards. His continued motivation becomes their continued motivation; the latter point handily proven by Paul Scholes and Ryan Giggs.

While some may dismiss this motivation as coming from the players, this is impossible. Nobody can sign perfectly motivated players for 25 years. Instead they become part of an environment, a shared mentality which infiltrates their attitudes on the pitch; generation after generation. Indeed, so strong his Ferguson’s desire to succeed that a horde of former players have turned to the dugout themselves – a record only matched by the AC Milan of Arrigo Sachi.

European parallels

A quick look at other elite managers suggests the reflection of personality adage is correct. Jose Mourinho treats each game as a war; his players do the same. His personality is determined and confrontational; his players behave accordingly. Conversely, his La Liga counterpart, Josep Guardiola, is a refined thinker framed by romanticism, a mindset that has translated into aesthetic beauty of unparalleled nature.

Domestically, Arsene Wenger appears the most stand-out example. He too is a romantic, aspiring to the same values as his Catalan blueprint. “What makes daily life interesting is that we try to transform it to something that is close to art,” he once said. “And football is like that. When I watch Barcelona, it is art.” Only naturally, his players aspire to similar goals, often sacrificing shooting opportunities in pursuit of that perfect goal.

The driving force of these motivations make up a big part of what “money cannot buy” – for better or worse. The beautiful thing is that they cannot be taught; they are simply the effects of an individual’s unshakable desire to become successful, resonated into a group of players.

For more than a decade, late winners have found the net at Old Trafford. Players and fans have come and gone. The only constant has been Ferguson.

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Alex Ferguson’s classic ‘cow in a field’ moment by Haugstad1006

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Analysis: The stats behind Chelsea’s Modric pursuit

Playmaker: Villas-Boas needs one. Photo: apasciuto

Chelsea’s toothless passing game suggests a midfield playmaker à la Luka Modric could prove the difference between? fourth and first this year. And Villas-Boas knows it.

The Blues’ need for creativity and flair are well documented. South American wizards have frequently filled the wish list since Robinho escaped their claws three years ago, but promising links with players such as Sergio Agüero and Neymar have resulted in little else than window shopping so far.

The apparent policy to throw strikers at the problem has not compensated. Fernando Torres and Drogba are yet to score this season and, with Andre Villas-Boas struggling to accommodate the latter, Chelsea seem to have bought themselves a new problem in the ￡18m ‘new Drogba’ – Romelu Lukaku.

Such worries have been confirmed by the Premier League opening fixtures, with stuttering displays against Stoke, West Bromwich and Norwich. The excellent Juan Mata will be a much-needed addition but, as this analysis finds, the team is screaming out for a midfield playmaker to get that heavy artillery firing.

Lack of penetration

Much anticipation had built over how Chelsea would play under Villas-Boas. It was always hard to judge against Stoke (indeed, even Lionel Messi would struggle at the Britannia…) but answers appeared in the two home games. The result was largely a side with plenty possession, but no idea what to do with it. This trend was evident against Norwich, where the chalkboard below is taken from. It shows completed passes from open play over 90 minutes, reflecting the areas where Chelsea conducted their build-up play to break down a stubborn home side.

?by?Guardian Chalkboards

Clearly, Chelsea’s full backs are cornerstones in the build-up play – a similar feat to Andre Villas-Boas’ Porto. Most passes are made along the flanks, with plenty inside the final third, and Norwich will have been defending the penalty box with little space between midfield and the defensive line.

The problem remains that no midfielders seem able to play vertical passes (passes towards the opponents goal) to players in dangerous positions. Indeed, out of 435 passes, only three arrived inside the penalty area. This role is crucial, because without it the ball is simply circulated from side to side. As the statistics show, Chelsea have tended to play ‘around’ the Norwich team – waiting for an opening to appear, but without the creativity to exploit it.

Villas-Boas offered fascinating insight into this himself when interviewed by sport science student Daniel Sousa – now his scout at Chelsea – in Portugal on March 27, 2009 – and the key passages were published by the Telegraph this August. In an in-depth discussion about tactics and football philosophy, Villas-Boas said:

“There are more spaces in football than people think. Even if you play against a low block team [a team defending deep], you immediately get half of the pitch. And after that, in attacking midfield, you can provoke the opponent with the ball, provoke him to move forward or sideways and open up a space. But many players can’t understand the game.

“They can’t think about or read the game. Things have become too easy for football players: high salaries, a good life, with a maximum of five hours work a day and so they can’t concentrate, can’t think about the game. Barcelona’s players are completely the opposite. Their players are permanently thinking about the game, about their movement, about how to provoke their opponent with the position of the ball.”

Despite Villas-Boas’ awareness of this, a comparison with Manchester United suggests his title rivals currently master this far better. The chalkboard below shows Manchester United’s completed passes from open play during their 3-0 win against Tottenham earlier this season – a game typifying their pass and move philosophy.

?by?Guardian Chalkboards

The result is clearly a much more varied passing pattern with no obvious concentrations of play. There are more vertical passes – out of 362 from open play, 12 found players inside the penalty area – and all three goals were scored from inside the box. Manchester United played 73 passes less than Chelsea, yet were clearly more effective.

Passing styles

Styles obviously contrast between Old Trafford and Stamford Bridge. United move the ball quicker to drag players out of position, posing lower demands for a single moment of genius to break teams down. Instead the two central midfielders largely play it simple to ‘keep things ticking’ – engineering a steady ball circulation that outmaneuvers teams through safe intelligent passes and smart movement.

Conversely, Chelsea’s slow tempo means spaces are harder to find when midfielders have the ball. Whereas ball circulation is maintained safely to ‘control’ matches, the art of finding attacking players in dangerous space is yet to be mastered. Inevitably, the front three are either isolated or forced to drop deep – a role neither of Drogba and Torres play particularly well.

Fernando Torres

It is worth to make this point on Torres. The Spaniard’s game revolves around getting into advanced positions – preferably with only one or two defenders to beat. This requires either quick transitions or a pass-master able to find him with vertical passes. With neither, Chelsea have a frustrated striker either running into a wall of defenders or losing himself in deep positions.

Functional: The Liverpool set-up under Rafa Benitez in 2008/2009

Rafael Benitez faced a similar problem when Xabi Alonso departed – nobody were able to find Torres or Steven Gerrard, and the goals quickly dried up. This is a vastly undermined factor in assessing Torres’ form. Villas-Boas was right pre-season when he blamed the team structure for the Spaniard’s failings – not the player. However he is still to figure out the solution.

Villas-Boas’ philosophy

The interview from 2009 suggests the Portuguese is well aware of how easy teams can stall. He points out how modern top sides now use midfielders to play vertical passes, relying on wingers to provide creativity.

Interestingly, he names Xabi Alonso and Andrea Pirlo as rare examples of players who can vary between vertical and diagonal passes to surprise the opponent.

The lack of such players, combined with an absence of wingers, can be fatal. Going back to Xabi Alonso at Liverpool, his presence meant reliance on wingers decreased because progression came from central areas. However, his departure saw the Reds lose their only source of vertical play – eventually leading to a total collapse.

Chelsea’s problem is of similar stature – they lack midfield playmakers as well as natural wingers. Juan Mata is a welcomed mixture of the two but, granted the team structure at Stamford Bridge, the vertical driving force must be located deeper.

Villas-Boas never had an out-and-out playmaker at Porto, but the tricky Silvestre Varela and the at times unplayable Hulk provided plenty of flair and trickery on each wing. Indeed, so far at Chelsea, the most prominent player has been Jose Bosingwa – a former winger possessing the sorely-missed ability to unlock defences by bursting past players.

The solution

The interview again becomes interesting when Daniel Sousa asks Villas-Boas how to break down defensive teams. The Chelsea boss replies:

“You have to provoke them with the ball, which is something most teams can’t do. I cannot understand it. It’s an essential factor in the game. At this time of ultra-low defensive block teams, you will have to learn how to provoke them with the ball. It’s the ball they want, so you have to defy them using the ball as a carrot.

“Louis Van Gaal’s idea is one of continuous circulation, one side to the other, until the moment that, when you change direction, a space opens up inside and you go through it. So, he provokes the opponent with horizontal circulation of the ball, until the moment that the opponent will start to pressure out of despair. What I believe in is to challenge the rival by driving the ball into him.”

The final sentence may hint at someone who can go past players – either in wide positions – or centrally to create 2 v 1 situations. An exemplary player of the latter would be Andres Iniesta – perhaps the closest version in England would be Luka Modric. A classical winger also fits the description, though someone with playmaking qualities would be ideal.

The graph below shows the Spurs midfielder’s completed passes from open play during a 0-0 draw against West Ham last year.

?by?Guardian Chalkboards

These passes typify the range and variety needed at Stamford Bridge. They are a mixture of vertical and horizontal passes – four of them arriving inside the penalty area –a few more just outside the penalty box. Chelsea failed with a bid for Modric on transfer deadline day, and the lack of an outright alternative playmaker will concern Villas-Boas. The ￡13m signing Raul Meireles is a coup in itself, but time will tell how much he can contribute to solve the Blues’ main problem.

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